



UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

**SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENTS: A
PROGRAMME FRAMEWORK FOR DIALOGUE AND
RECONCILIATION IN KENYA IN THE AFTERMATH OF ELECTIONS-
RELATED VIOLENCE**

PROJECT DOCUMENT

United Nations Development Programme

Country: Kenya

Project Document

Project Title	Supporting Implementation of the Peace Agreements: A Programme Framework for Dialogue and Reconciliation in Kenya in the Aftermath of Elections-related Violence
UNDAF Outcome(s):	UNDAF Outcome 2:2 Humanitarian Impact and Risk of Natural and Human-Made Disaster Reduced
Expected CP Outcome(s): <i>(Those linked to the project and extracted from the CP)</i>	National plans and policies for conflict and disaster management operationalised and capacity developed at national and district level.
Expected Output(s): <i>(Those that will result from the project)</i>	1) Contributions by parliamentarians towards peace and reconciliation initiatives increased; 2) New institutions mandated by the peace agreements functionally established, and able to develop and implement effective frameworks and policies for addressing the core issues behind post-electoral violence; 3) Local level conflicts resolved through mediation, dialogue promotion, and reconciliation efforts by civic and inter-faith organizations; 4) Women in affected communities successfully assisted in overcoming trauma and in playing visible and active roles in promoting peace in their communities; 5) Youth in affected communities, including those participating in the activities of tribal militias and other armed groups, actively engaged in the promotion of dialogue and reconciliation; 6) Capacities of UNDP and partner agencies to support dialogue and reconciliation processes strengthened
Executing Entity:	UNDP
Implementing Agencies:	Amani Forum, Concerned Citizens of Peace, Partnership for Peace, PeaceNet, Maendeleo ya Wanawake, Picha ya Mtaani, National Council of Churches of Kenya.

Brief Description

The peace agreements signed following the post-election violence in February 2008 explicitly recognized the need for building systematic national and local capacities for conflict management, for establishing new national policies and institutions to address critical issues such as land, reconciliation, and socio-economic inequity, and for harnessing the energies of diverse groups such as women, youth, parliamentarians, tribal elders, communities of faith, and the private sector towards this end. In response to these needs, this project strives to engage with a variety of partners at both the national and local levels to promote reconciliation, support the implementation of the peace agreements, and foster inter-communal dialogue as a means to restoring trust and confidence in the public space and contributing towards healing, reconciliation and peacebuilding in the nation.

Programme Period:	<u>2 years</u>
Key Result Area (Strategic Plan)	<u>3.1: Enhancing conflict and disaster risk management capabilities</u>
Atlas Award ID:	_____
Start date:	<u>1/05/09</u>
End Date	<u>30/04/11</u>
PAC Meeting Date	_____
Management Arrangements	<u>DEX</u>

Total resources required	<u>USD 3,090,000</u>
Total allocated resources:	<u>USD 1,635,000</u>
• Regular	<u>USD 400,000</u>
• Other:	
o BCPR	<u>USD 1,235,000</u>
Unfunded budget:	<u>USD 1,455,000</u>
In-kind Contributions	_____

Agreed by (UNDP):

Alex Guma
Resident Representative

15/04/09

MAS

I. Situation Analysis

1. This proposal should be read in conjunction with the attached “strategic framework” document which details some of the causes, impact, and analyses of the violence that afflicted the Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western, and Nairobi provinces of Kenya between December 2007 – March 2008, and which took an estimated 1,500 lives and displaced an approximately 350,000 people.
2. As of end-November 2008, a significant number of displaced Kenyans, despite concerted government efforts in this regard (including through the launch of Operation Rudi Nyumbani in May 2008), remained reluctant to return to their localities of origin given that many of the local causes of violence, including land and inter-tribal conflicts, remained unresolved. Following an initial set of peace agreements among the primary protagonists mediated by end-February 2008 by the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, or the Annan Panel, the political impasse over power-sharing had only been resolved in early April by giving cabinet posts of ministers and deputy ministers to over ninety individuals, almost half the parliament. This largest and most expensive cabinet in Kenyan history had raised skepticism among the general population as to the ability of the new government to move beyond serving the interests of its constituents, or to bring about real change. Relations between communities had been vitiated to such a degree due to ethnically-based violence that questions continued to be raised as to the ability of Kenya to survive as a single state. Following an election that saw great popular enthusiasm and a record turnout, the fouling of the aftermath had significantly increased the level of mistrust between the population and the political leadership, and also among the latter.
3. At the same time, there were positive signs. The country’s Northern and Northeastern provinces, which had seen the building of significant local capacities for peace prior to elections, had remained largely peaceful in the aftermath of the elections despite a long history of political and inter-tribal violence. Both prior to the signing of the peace agreement, as well as in its aftermath, Kenyan civic organizations and local governments had initiated dialogue efforts in several of the affected communities. These had reportedly stemmed violence in some areas and allowed displaced persons to return, and also helped create the space for political dialogue at the national level. Despite mutual mistrust, the president and the new prime minister, and parliamentarians and leaders from the major political parties, had taken visible steps towards reconciliation, especially through joint appearances and tours in the worst-affected areas. Critically, the president and the prime minister had also developed a cordial working relationship, and both displayed strong commitment to pursuing key reforms such as those dealing with land and the constitution. The Kenyan parliament had quickly adopted the National Accord and Reconciliation Act following the peace agreement in February, thus allowing the new coalition government to be established. With continued assistance from the African Union, under whose auspices the Annan Panel had been constituted, the Parliament had also moved quickly to develop legislation to establish several of the bodies mandated by the February agreement to address issues such as land reform and reconciliation. A “national peace accord implementation committee” had been constituted in the aftermath of the agreement, and short term national plans had been quickly developed for the implementation of the various aspects of the peace agreement. It is worthwhile to note that while the presidential elections had yielded a bloody aftermath, the parliamentary polls had led to a younger, more dynamic parliament with a

reformist majority, and with the largest complement yet of women parliamentarians. Members of the parliament remained at the forefront of reconciliation efforts.

4. Both the continued challenges and the existing opportunities highlighted the need for a sustained effort to promote reconciliation, support the implementation of the peace agreements, and foster cross-community dialogue as a means to restoring trust and confidence in the public space. Even as Kenya began to deal with complex issues such as land reform, constitutional review, the overhaul of the electoral system, and truth-telling and reconciliation following the post-election violence, the need for the construction of a Kenyan identity that transcended tribal affiliations was deeply evident. Equally evident was the need for a different type of politics, wherein leaders did not resort to the use of armed gangs and tribal militias to pursue political objectives, but instead used constructive negotiation, and the practice of political competition in a win-win, rather than a win-lose manner.

II. Strategy: A New Programme Framework for Dialogue and Reconciliation: Outputs and Activities

5. Prior to national elections in December 2007, UNDP-Kenya, with the assistance of UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and the UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs, had initiated a two-year programme in March 2007 aimed at promoting dialogue, peace and reconciliation in advance of the elections, and to prepare for post-electoral efforts should the elections be contested. The initial implementation of the programme had primarily focused on harnessing the energies of youth, women, and the popular media against electoral violence, and featured a number of visible cultural and media events. These efforts were largely successful, and the elections were mostly peaceful and saw a large turnout. However, once the results were contested, violence broke out, especially in those areas which did not have stable local capacities for preventing or managing such violence.

6. The four peace agreements signed in February explicitly recognized the need for building systematic national and local capacities for conflict management, for establishing new national policies and institutions to address critical issues such as land, reconciliation, and socio-economic inequity, and for harnessing the energies of diverse groups such as women, youth, parliamentarians, tribal elders, communities of faith, and the private sector towards this end.

Relationship between different areas of UNDP and BCPR Assistance

7. Based on these agreements, an assessment mission in mid-February 2008 conducted jointly by BCPR and UNDP's Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA) yielded the attached "strategic framework." This framework proposed four programming areas for UNDP: a short-to-mid-term early recovery initiative focused on restoring livelihoods destroyed by violence and ensuring the sustainable return of IDPs, and which has now received assistance from BCPR; an expanded initiative on reduction of illicit small arms and related armed violence targeted at reducing the immediate precipitants of violence, and which is also now supported by BCPR; an expanded programme on building local capacities for conflict management, given that such capacities helped conserve peace in the normally tense Northern and Coast provinces and also given that they are specifically called for by the peace agreements, throughout Kenya, and particularly in

Rift Valley and Nyanza; and a revamped and expanded programme on the promotion of dialogue and reconciliation to focus specifically on assistance for relevant national actors in implementing the peace agreements and in promoting longer-term reconciliation. The third and fourth initiatives are yet to be assisted by BCPR, and are now being brought before BPAC. While each of the four initiatives has different primary national counterparts and implementation modalities, they are complementary in that they address different chronological and substantive aspects of the common challenge of inter-ethnic violence in Kenya. In terms of their implementation and results, they will be reviewed and coordinated through four mechanisms: the “senior advisory group” in the UNDP CO comprising the RC/RR, the Country Director, and the senior economic and peace and development advisors; the “peace and development team” in the UN Country team; the National Steering Committee on Conflict Management and Peace-building and the Focal Point on Small Arms; and the “national peace accord implementation committee.” The initiative on assisting the implementation of the peace agreements, which is presented below, takes into account the initial priorities identified by the “national peace accord implementation committee,” and a number of elements were identified with UNDP-Kenya to revise and upgrade the programme on dialogue and reconciliation. These include:

Key Outputs of the Programme to Support the Implementation of the Peace Agreements

*Output 1: Contributions by **parliamentarians** towards peace and reconciliation initiatives increased, and better collaboration and consensus obtained on the implementation of the peace agreements.*

Activities:

- a) Ensure, in partnership with the Amani Forum and other relevant forums, that members of parliament acquire skills for conflict management and resolution and violence prevention, and for addressing issues of small arms control, including through “leadership transformation” and capacity-building initiatives which lead to the practice of alternative and progressive means for the resolution of political conflict, and to accompany them in applying these skills in the parliament as well as in their constituencies;
- b) Assist parliamentarians in more systematically undertaking joint efforts to support dialogue, healing and reconciliation on the ground, including through visits by cross-party and cross-ethnic delegations to the affected communities to convey messages of co-existence and reconciliation;

*Output 2: New **institutions mandated by the peace agreements** functionally established, and able to develop and implement effective frameworks and policies for addressing the core issues behind post-electoral violence, including land, electoral reform, and tribe-based competition.*

Activities:

- c) Building on the work of the “national peace accord implementation committee,” assist with the establishment of a longer-term, autonomous internal mediation platform in order to provide independent facilitation, monitoring, and reporting assistance (as a complement to

any direct international assistance in this regard) for the implementation of agreements mediated by the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, especially with regard to the mediation and resolution of conflicts among individual and institutional partners in the coalition government;

- d) Provide technical assistance, as appropriate and agreed with other UN, international, and national partners, (i) for the establishment and implementation of the national Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) and the Ethnic and Race Relations Commission (ERRC) (the TJRC bill has been approved by Parliament while the Ethnic Relations bill is being re-drafted by the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs), including by making available the “best practices” and “lessons learned” from other similar experiences, (ii) for the conduct of a multi-stakeholder dialogue around the review and finalization of the draft national land policy, and (iii) the provision of relevant technical expertise on electoral reform, and facilitation of consensus around the elements of this reform;
- e) Encourage and support, in the context of the work of the Ethnic and Race Relations Commission (or an appropriate entity should the establishment of the commission remain deadlocked) , a systematic process of national dialogue, at both the national and local levels, on practical options for the transformation of tribe-based identity and conflict into “constructive diversity,” i.e.as assets for political, cultural, and socio-economic development as opposed to sources of violent conflict, and to draw on relevant experiences of other developing multi-ethnic democratic societies in this regard (e.g. India, Indonesia, Ghana, Nigeria); in this connection, to provide technical and analytical advice and support to the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs, and the Office of the Prime Minister, including through the recruitment and deployment of a senior advisor on National Cohesion to support the Ministry and the Office of the Prime Minister.
- f) Assist, as requested and appropriate, relevant government and civic partners with the translation of the recommendations of the Kiplagat Eminent Persons’ Group into an effective process for the completion of constitutional reform, and support the organization of dialogue among key stakeholders to develop national consensus on some of the contentious issues affecting the constitutional review.

*Output 3: Local level conflicts resolved through mediation, dialogue promotion, and reconciliation efforts by **civic and inter-faith organizations**, and increased capacity achieved through this process on the part of these organizations for similar future efforts.*

Activities:

- g) Ensure systematic assistance through key civic umbrella networks, including Peace-Net and its Electoral Violence Response Initiative, the Partnership for Peace (of which UNDP is a member and key supporter), Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organization (the largest women’s network), and interfaith organizations (ECCK (Christian); SUPKEM (Islamic); the Hindu Council) for specific and targeted efforts to conduct dialogue and reconciliation initiatives, and provide for increased security, in the affected communities;

- h) Assist civic organizations in developing and broadcasting through vernacular local FM radio stations programmes aimed at promoting dialogue and reconciliation, e.g. especially facilitated dialogue roundtables among key civic actors and parties to conflict in a particular locality, or music or other programmes created by, and targeted at, youth; and to provide support to the Media Council of Kenya to develop and implement a policy on local language broadcasting.

*Output 4: **Women in affected communities** successfully assisted in overcoming trauma from **sexual-and-gender-based violence**, and violence inflicted on their households and communities, and in playing visible and active roles in promoting peace in their communities.*

Activities

- i) Provide systematic assistance for civic organizations in ensuring that all their members who are engaged in peace-building and humanitarian initiatives on the ground have received the necessary skills in trauma counseling, especially when dealing with cases of sexual-or-gender-based-violence;
- j) Assist, through Maendeleo Ya Wanawake and local authorities, efforts to ensure the safety, emotional and physical health, and general well-being of women in IDP camps and in the affected communities, including by establishing viable and staffed “gender desks” in existing law enforcement facilities, as well as the new police stations established under the government’s push to enhance security at the local level;
- k) Identify, through civic umbrella networks, instances where women have, or can, play specific and critical roles in the promotion of dialogue and reconciliation, and ensure systematic support for such efforts;
- l) Assist women parliamentarians in developing and implementing a detailed plan for enhancing women’s participation in peace-building and reconciliation efforts at the national and local levels.

*Output 5: **Youth in affected communities**, including those participating in the activities of tribal militias and other armed groups, actively engaged in the promotion of dialogue and reconciliation.*

Activities:

- m) Assist, together with other UN partners and with the Partnership for Peace, efforts to engage youth in peace-building and reconciliation efforts, including by expanding initiatives, e.g. the recent partnership between UNDP and UNV to employ youth as paid UN volunteers to serve as mediators and reconcilers in their communities, where youth serve as agents of positive change; the UNDP-UNV partnership programme also provides job and life skills, and employment counseling, to youth so as to avail them of economic opportunities once their work as volunteers is concluded; this ongoing programme, which is considered a model, is

based on a thorough assessment of the needs and constraints of youth in the slum areas of Nairobi, which were among the worst affected by violence, and could be applied to other parts of the country.

- n) Work through tribal elders and community leaders, and with the Partnership for Peace, to engage youth who serve as “tribal warriors” (and who, along with members of secret sects and societies such as the “mungiki” and the “Baghdad Boys,” inflicted the bulk of organized violence in the aftermath of elections) on viable means to pursuing tribal traditions through non-violent means (sporting competitions and joint hunts, for instance), and to assist them in disengaging, through the provision of socio-economic alternatives, from participation in the activities of underground gangs and secret societies.

Output 6: Capacities of UNDP and partner agencies to support dialogue and reconciliation processes strengthened

- o) Establish a Peace and Development Team under the UN RC/ UNDP RR for a two-year duration to support the implementation of initiatives by UN agencies pertaining to dialogue and reconciliation; the reduction in the availability of small arms and increased security at the community level; and the building of national capacities for conflict management. The team should be headed by the Senior Peace and Development Advisor (PDA), who will assist the UNDP Resident Representative, including in his capacity as the UN Resident Coordinator, with developing a strategic UN engagement with peace-building and reconciliation issues. The PDA should be supported by two national programme officers, with one having specific gender-related expertise. The team’s efforts, as well as those of the Enhanced Security Unit (referred to below) should also be assisted by an international Advisor on National Cohesion to be deployed in the Office of the Prime Minister or the Ministry for Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs. This advisor has already been requested by these entities as part of their core capacity for implementing a programme for building social and political cohesion at the national level.
- p) Support the secretariat of the Partnership for Peace, including through two programme staff for the two-year duration of the programme, so as to ensure capacity for its work with youth, and in ensuring its coordination of the activities of its members with regard to dialogue and reconciliation.

III. Management Arrangements

8. As with the current BCPR-assisted initiative on dialogue and reconciliation, the programme will be executed using the DEX modality. In order to ensure national ownership and participation by all relevant stakeholders, the activities of the programme will be overseen by a national steering committee, which will serve as the project assurer, and will include representatives of project beneficiaries, including relevant government departments (especially Provincial Administration, Justice, Youth, Office of the Prime Minister), Parliament, women’s organizations, key civic organizations, and the national peace accord implementation Committee. The Steering Committee will meet on a quarterly basis, and receive reports from the RC/RR and

the senior PDA on the implementation of the programme. The project shall be implemented according to the Work Plan as agreed between UNDP and the collaborating organisations.

9. Substantive technical and policy assistance, and the collation of “best practices” and “lessons learned,” will also be provided for the implementation of this programme by an expert working group at UN Headquarters convened under the auspices of the Expert Reference Group of the Framework Team, an informal internal UN mechanism for coordination on prevention action. This expert working group will include representatives of DPA, UNDP (BCPR and RBA), and DESA, as well as the Senior Peace and Development Advisor.

10. The Peace and Development Team (PDT) will work in very close coordination, through the Country Director, with the Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Unit of UNDP-Kenya in supporting the implementation of the proposed programme. It is important to note that the PDT will not be created on a standing basis, but only for the duration of the implementation of the linked initiatives on dialogue and reconciliation, community security, and the building of national capacities for conflict management.

11. The Peace and Development Team will also work very closely with the National Steering Committee (NSC) on Peace-building in the Office of the President, and with the African Union team supporting the implementation of the agreements mediated by the Annan Panel. In order to ensure the best working relationships, close coordination, and strategic collaboration, members of the PDT will meet with the secretariats of the NSC and the Partnership for Peace on a bi-weekly basis, and will be convened for this purpose by the PDA.

12. Collaborative partners under this project are as follows:

Amani Forum

The Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace – AMANI Forum is an action-based African Parliamentary initiative engaged in peacebuilding and conflict mitigation. AMANI is a Swahili word which means “Peace” and the Forum is a membership organization with over seven hundred Members of Parliament drawn from seven national parliaments in the Great Lakes Region and the East African Legislative Assembly. It is the only organization of this kind in the region. It is organised through national chapters that provide opportunities and create space to analyse, debate and mobilize efforts towards conflict management and to generate peace initiatives at national levels.

Concerned Citizens of Peace

The concerned citizens for peace initiative came into being on January 1, 2008 after violence erupted in Kenya following the elections. The original five core members, who included Kenyan peace mediators and members of the civil society, started the group in order to rally for peace and tolerance and to call for dialogue after the country witnessed its worst post-election violence. The original five core members included: Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, a renowned Kenyan peace mediator and former special envoy for Somalia; General Daniel Opande (Rtd), Kenyan Kenyan Peacekeeper in Liberia; General Lazaro Sumbeiywo (Rtd) who served as Kenya’s Special Envoy to the IGAD-led Sudanese peace process (1997-98) and then as mediator (2001-05); Ms. Dekha Ibrahim Abdi, who was instrumental in establishing local peace structures in northern Kenya, and

George Wachira, a policy advisor with NPI. This group is well-respected, perceived as neutral and has high-level access to policy-makers.

Partnership for Peace

The Partnership for Peace is a broad-based network of organizations and actors comprised of civil society organizations, faith-based organizations, the media council of Kenya and women's groups among others who came together to campaign for peaceful elections in Kenya.

PeaceNet

The Peace and Development Network (PeaceNet-Kenya) is a national umbrella organizations of NGOs, CBOs, religious organizations and individuals engaged in peace building and conflict resolution at the community-level. PeaceNet also builds capacity and provides opportunities for collaboration, facilitation and mobilization of local initiatives for peace building, promotion of justice and conflict resolution.

Maendeleo ya Wanawake

Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organisation (MYWO), a grassroots based women's membership organisation has over 3 million individual members and more than 25,000 group affiliates. MYWO's primary goal is to improve and enhance the social, economic status of all women in Kenya. Towards this end, MYWO also aims to build the capacity of women as key players in peacebuilding in order for them to have access to the necessary tools to fulfill that role. MYWO is the largest women's organization in Kenya with the widest reach nationally.

National Council of Churches of Kenya

The National Council of Churches in Kenya, founded in 1918, is the world's largest Council of churches. NCCCK is a fellowship of protestant churches and Christian organizations registered in Kenya. To facilitate the united mission of the Christian church in Kenya, the Council promotes fellowship and ecumenism, nurtures a common understanding of the Christian faith and mission, builds the capacities of the membership and enhances the creation of a just and sustainable society. The NCCCK provides a forum for member churches and organizations to act on common issues.

IV. Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

12. The programme outputs, as stated above and in the RRF below, will serve as proxies for targets. The achievement of these targets will be measured against indicators established for each output. During the first quarter of the programme's implementation, the Senior Peace and Development Advisor should lead the development of baseline data for the following indicators, with the "base" figure being the monthly level of the occurrences of the indicators (with the exception of output 2, which is measured against the time-frames established in the peace agreements of February 2008:

“Negative Indicators”

- a. *Output 1*: Instances of deadlock in executive or legislative decision-making processes as they relate to the implementation of the peace agreements, as determined at the national level;
- b. *Output 1*: The use of inflammatory or ethnically-slanted rhetoric by members of parliament, political parties, or government leaders, as determined at the national level;
- c. *Output 2*: Number of instances of lack of implementation, relative to the time-frame established in the original agreements, of the provisions in the peace agreements of February 2008; as determined at the national level.
- d. *Output 3*: Incidents of violence or intimidation against returnees in select districts, with the sample being three representative districts;
- e. *Output 3*: Instances of mobilization on ethnic or tribal lines for the actual or intended use of violence or intimidation to address disputes or grievances, with the sample being three representative districts.
- f. *Output 4*: Instances of violence against women in IDP camps, and among returnees, with the sample being three representative districts.
- g. *Output 4*: Instances of physical or verbal abuse, or other attempts to limit their participation, against women seeking to play roles, or active, in public life, as determined at the national level.
- h. *Output 5*: Continued high levels of youth participation in violent inter-tribal competition and gang-related activity, as determined at the national level.

Positive indicators:

- a. *Output 1*: Specific incidents of development or promotion of messages of ethnic and communal tolerance and collaboration by political leaders across group or party lines, including in the parliament.
- b. *Output 2*: Specific incidents of consensus reached in parliament over formulation of legislation or policy in the context of the implementation of the peace agreements.
- c. *Output 3*: Specific incidents of potentially violent tension, or ongoing violence, addressed due to interventions by civic and religious groups.
- d. *Output 4*: Specific incidents identified wherein women have played key roles in conflict management or peace-building.
- e. *Output 5*: Specific instances of promotion of dialogue or cross-community collaboration by youth or youth-based organizations.

13. Once the base figures have been identified (ideally in collaboration with an autonomous Kenyan entity such as the Nairobi Peace Initiative), a 25% change will be sought in these base figures by end of the first year of project implementation, i.e. December 2009, with a reduction in the numbers of the negative indicators, and an increase in the numbers for the positive indicators. In compiling these assessments, and in monitoring and evaluating the project’s contributions to changes in these indicators, the

programme team will be assisted by the headquarters-based working group detailed in paragraph 8.

V. Gender Strategy

14. **The proposed programme has a clear and well-defined output (output 4) on gender that engages frontally with the impact of the post-electoral violence on women, and on enhancing their roles in subsequent peace-building and reconciliation activities.** The evaluation indicators developed in paragraphs 11 and 12 should help track progress with regard to this output.

VI. Sustainability Strategy

15. Following electoral violence in 2008, the UNDP Country Office has expended all its crisis-related resources, as well as TRAC 3 contributions, on addressing the immediate needs arising from the impact of this violence. These have included both early recovery needs, as well as short-term and violence mitigation measures on the ground. The contribution sought from BCPR will therefore, for the first year of the programme, help extend these efforts, and building on the CO's contributions, enable efforts towards addressing the deeper-seated causes of the violence, as well as building national capacities for addressing future conflicts. For the second year of the programme, the senior management of the UNDP CO, as well as the Peace and Development Team, will develop and implement a resource mobilization strategy. Definitive or interim positive outcomes from the first year will be used to build momentum for this strategy. In-kind and financial contributions will also be sought from the Government of Kenya.

16. Over a two year period, the majority of the institutional innovations and activities developed and implemented through this programme will be sought to be subsumed under appropriate institutions of the Kenyan government, or under civic organizations and other national counterparts. Again, the Peace and Development Team in the Country Team will develop and implement a strategy from 2009-10 to identify the relevant national counterparts, and to work closely with them to ensure effective sustainability, where warranted, for the initiatives and activities developed through this programme.

VII. Risk Management Strategy

17. The following risks, and strategies for addressing them, have been identified for the project:

<i>Risk</i>	<i>Strategy</i>
Political tensions are likely to rise, and cooperation around the implementation of peace agreements likely to decrease, as	The speedy initial implementation of critical activities under outputs 1 and 2 should help "institutionalize" important

<p>political contest for national elections in 2008 intensifies.</p>	<p>elements of the agreements, and help ensure that government departments and civil society can maintain the momentum should high-level political actors be distracted; the expansion of local peace infrastructures throughout the Rift Valley and Nyanza should also help ensure that additional political tensions do not lead to violent mobilization on the ground.</p>
<p>Lack of coordination between multiple actors, governmental and non-governmental, engaged with implementation may actually hamper the process.</p>	<p>The Steering Committee mechanism should provide ample space for the relevant coordination, as should the Peace and Development Team of the UNCT led by the Senior Peace and Development Advisor.</p>
<p>Full resources necessary for the programme may not be mobilized.</p>	<p>In addition to the Steering Committee and the Peace and Development Team (select donors could be invited to meetings of both), the Senior Peace and Development Advisor, under the guidance of the RC/RR, will engage donors in a dialogue on UN efforts to support the implementation of the peace agreements.</p>

VIII. Strategic Results Framework, 2008-10: Detailed Programme Outputs

18. The proposed programme will have the following detailed outputs:

Intended Outputs	Indicative Activities: Year 1	Indicative Activities: Year 2	Budget description and costs: Year 1	Budget description and costs: Year 2	Responsible parties (in addition to UNDP Country Office)
<p>Output 1:</p> <p>Target: Contributions by parliamentarians towards peace and reconciliation initiatives increased, and better collaboration and consensus obtained on the implementation of the peace agreements.</p> <p>Baseline:</p> <p>a) Initial joint efforts by parliamentarians in areas affected by violence not yet systematic, or able to achieve significant impact.</p> <p>b) Significant acrimony on parliament floor in drafting of legislation pertinent to implementation of</p>	<p>a) Six exercises on imparting skills for leadership, collaborative decision-making, and conflict resolution conducted for all parliamentarians (approximately 35 parliamentarians per exercise, for a total of 227 members of parliament);</p> <p>b) Parliamentarians assisted in carrying out fifteen joint initiatives (three each for Nyanza, Western, Rift Valley, Nairobi, and Coast provinces) to support dialogue, healing and reconciliation on the</p>	<p>Parliamentarians assisted in carrying out an additional fifteen initiatives towards dialogue and reconciliation at the local level.</p>	<p>Six facilitated workshops/ exercises: US \$ 60, 000</p> <p>Ten facilitated half-day meetings: US \$ 20, 000</p> <p>International consultants: US \$ 30 000</p> <p>International travel: US \$ 10, 000</p> <p>Domestic travel: US \$ 40, 000</p> <p>Total for year 1: 160, 000</p>	<p>Four facilitated workshops/ exercises: US \$ 40, 000</p> <p>Five facilitated one-day meetings: US \$ 10, 000</p> <p>International consultants: US \$ 15, 000</p> <p>International travel: US \$ 15, 000</p> <p>National consultants: US \$ 30, 000</p> <p>Domestic travel: US \$ 20, 000</p> <p>Total for year 2: US \$ 130, 000</p>	<p>a. Parliament</p> <p>b. Amani Forum</p> <p>c. Political parties</p> <p>d. Provincial Administration</p> <p>e. Women's civic groups</p>

<p>peace agreements.</p>	<p>ground, including through visits by cross-party and cross-ethnic delegations to the affected communities to convey messages of co-existence and reconciliation.</p>				
<p>Output 2: Target: New institutions mandated by the peace agreements functionally established, and able to develop and implement effective frameworks and policies for addressing the core issues behind post-electoral violence, including land, electoral reform, and tribe-based competition.</p> <p>Baseline: a) No reliable mechanism currently in existence for mediation of</p>	<p>a) Relevant civic and government partners assisted in engaging in facilitated consultations to define the parameters of a systematic internal mediation platform (similar to Ghana's National Peace Council), prepare an implementation plan for this platform, and to launch the platform as part of the system of government, including through the preparation and adoption of relevant legislation.</p> <p>b) Technical assistance</p>	<p>a) TJRC and ERRC assisted, if established, in developing strategies and work plans, and acquiring implementation capacities therein.</p> <p>b) Technical assistance provided for translation of draft national land policy into legislation, and the adoption and implementation of this legislation, including by relevant government bodies.</p> <p>c) Technical assistance provided for translation of</p>	<p>Ten facilitated workshops/ exercises: US \$ 100, 000 Fifteen facilitated half-day meetings: US \$ 30, 000 International consultants: US \$ 40 000 International travel: US \$ 15, 000 Domestic travel: US \$ 60, 000 Total for year 1: 245, 000</p>	<p>Six facilitated workshops/ exercises: US \$ 60, 000 Five facilitated one-day meetings: US \$ 10, 000 International consultants: US \$ 30, 000 International travel: US \$ 15, 000 Publication and dissemination: US \$ 15, 000 National consultants: US \$ 30, 000 Domestic travel: US \$ 20, 000 Total for year 2: US \$ 180, 000</p>	<p>a. Parliament b. Civic Organizations (including women's organizations) c. Political parties d. African Union mediation support team</p>

<p>conflicts among government institutions and relevant parties over the implementation of peace agreements.</p> <p>b) Implementation of recommendations of two commissions established under the peace process currently deadlocked within the coalition government;</p> <p>c) Incomplete national consensus over draft packages on land, electoral, and constitutional reform.</p>	<p>provided, as appropriate and agreed with other UN, international, and national partners, for the establishment and implementation of the national Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission and the National Ethnic and Race Relations Commission (ERRC), including by making available the “best practices” and “lessons learned” from other national TRC experiences;</p> <p>c) Multi-stakeholder dialogue around the review and finalization of the draft national land policy launched, and the TJRC (or another appropriate entity) assisted in conducting this dialogue;</p> <p>d) TJRC (or another</p>	<p>proposed electoral reforms into legislation, and the adoption and implementation of this legislation by the National Electoral Commission and other relevant bodies.</p> <p>d) Technical assistance provided for translation of the agreed-on constitutional reform package into legislation, and the adoption and implementation of this legislation, including by relevant government bodies.</p> <p>e) Technical and logistical assistance provided for advocacy around, and the dissemination of, the elements of a cross-national ethnic</p>		
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	<p>appropriate entity) assisted, in consultation with other relevant national and international partners, with the provision of relevant technical expertise on electoral reform, and facilitation of consensus around the elements of this reform.</p> <p>e) ERRC (or another appropriate entity) assisted in conducting dialogue around the development of a cross-ethnic national identity, and the means to promoting such an identity.</p> <p>f) Relevant national actors assisted in finalizing agreement on constitutional reforms based on recommendations from the Kiplagat eminent persons'</p>	<p>identity established under ERRC auspices (or that of another appropriate entity).</p> <p>f) National mediation platform established in first year assisted in acquiring all relevant capacities, and in applying them to at least six select instance of mediation at the national level, as requested and appropriate.</p>		
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<p>Output 3:</p> <p>Target: Local level conflicts resolved through mediation, dialogue promotion, and reconciliation efforts by civic and inter-faith organizations, and increased capacity achieved through this process on the part of these organizations for similar future efforts.</p> <p>a) Continued high incidence of violent conflicts and insecurity at the community level, especially the Rift Valley, Northern, and Nyanza provinces.</p> <p>b) Continued circulation, at local level, of messages intended to magnify</p>	<p>group.</p> <p>a) Systematic assistance provided through key civic umbrella networks, including Peace-Net and its Electoral Violence Response Initiative, the Partnership for Peace (of which UNDP is a member and key supporter), Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organization (the largest women's network), and interfaith organizations (ECCK (Christian); SUPKEM (Islamic); the Hindu Council) for at least twelve (average one per month) specific and targeted local-level dialogue and reconciliation initiatives, or similar efforts to provide for increased security in</p>	<p>a) An additional twelve local level dialogue and community security initiatives supported through civic organizations;</p> <p>b) An additional four programmes promoting reconciliation, or enabling youth participation in peace-building, prepared and broadcast over radio with the support of civic organizations.</p>	<p>workshops/ exercises: US \$ 100, 000 Fifteen facilitated half-day meetings: US \$ 30, 000 National consultants: US \$ 20, 000 Domestic travel: US \$ 60, 000 Total for year 1: 210, 000</p>	<p>Six facilitated workshops/ exercises: US \$ 60, 000 Five facilitated one-day meetings: US \$ 10, 000 National consultants: US \$ 30, 000 Domestic travel: US \$ 20, 000 Total for year 2: US \$ 120, 000</p>	<p>a. Peace-Net/ Electoral Violence Response Initiative b. Partnership for Peace c. Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organization d. ECCK e. SUPKEM f. the Hindu Council</p>
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<p>ethnic stereotyping and resentment.</p>	<p>the affected communities.</p> <p>b) Relevant civic organizations identified, and the assisted in developing and broadcasting through vernacular local FM radio stations programmes at least four programmes, over a twenty-month period, aimed at promoting dialogue and reconciliation, e.g. especially facilitated dialogue roundtables among key civic actors and parties to conflict in a particular locality, or music or other programmes created by, and targeted at, youth, including development and implementation of policy on local language broadcasting</p>				
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<p>Output 4: Target: Women in affected communities successfully assisted in overcoming trauma from sexual-and-gender-based violence, and violence inflicted on their households and communities, and in playing visible and active roles in promoting peace in</p>	<p>a) Key civic organizations (a total of five for the first year) assisted in ensuring that all their members who are engaged in peace-building and humanitarian initiatives on the ground have received the</p>	<p>a) “Gender desks” and other innovations in IDP camps and affected communities to assist victims of sexual-and-gender-based violence and other trauma sustained through second year.</p>	<p>Five facilitated workshops/ exercises: US \$ 50, 000 International consultants: US \$ 40 000 Domestic travel: US \$ 30, 000 Personnel (12 trained national professionals to staff “gender desks”): US \$ 180, 000 Total for year 1: 300, 000</p>	<p>Two facilitated workshops/ exercises: US \$ 20, 000 Five facilitated one-day meetings: US \$ 10, 000 National consultants: US \$ 30, 000 Domestic travel: US \$ 20, 000 Personnel (12 trained national professionals to staff “gender desks”): US \$ 180, 000</p>	<p>a. Parliament b. Civic organizations c. Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organization d. Kenya National Police e. Provincial Administration</p>
	<p>a) An additional twelve local level dialogue and community security initiatives supported through civic organizations; b) An additional four programmes promoting reconciliation, or enabling youth participation in peace-building, prepared and broadcast over radio with the support of civic organizations.</p>				

<p>their communities.</p> <p>Baseline:</p> <p>a) Continued absence of systematic assistance for victims of sexual and other trauma and violence in IDP camps and the affected communities (despite ongoing efforts by civic organizations).</p> <p>b) Despite increased numbers of women in the Kenyan parliament, a continued lack of visible leadership by women on issues related to the peace process.</p>	<p>necessary skills in trauma counseling, especially when dealing with cases of sexual-or-gender-based-violence;</p> <p>b) Local efforts, especially by Maendeleo Ya Wanawake and local authorities, to ensure the safety, emotional and physical health, and general well-being of women in IDP camps and in the affected communities assisted (for a total of twelve select camps and communities for the first year), including by establishing viable and staffed “gender desks” in existing law enforcement facilities, as well as at the new police stations established</p>	<p>b) Forum of women MPs constituted in first year assisted in taking up at least four additional pieces of legislation with regard to mainstreaming the rights and protection of women, and in conducting six on-ground mediation or conflict resolution initiatives.</p>	<p>Total for year 2: US \$ 260, 000</p>	
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	<p>under the government's push to enhance security at the local level;</p> <p>c) Efforts by women to play specific and critical roles in the promotion of dialogue and reconciliation identified, through civic umbrella networks, and supported with technical and other resources in at least twelve instances;</p> <p>d) Twenty-one women members of the tenth Kenyan parliament assisted in constituting forum to promote the protection of women through relevant legislation (efforts to mainstream the rights and protection of women into at least four pieces of legislation involving</p>				
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	<p>implementation of the peace agreements), and to support women's roles in peace-making and conflict resolution in the areas affected by violence (i.e. at least six on-ground mediation and conflict resolution efforts led or significantly assisted by women) .</p>				
<p>Output 5: Target: Youth in affected communities, including those participating in the activities of tribal militias and other armed groups, actively engaged in the promotion of dialogue and reconciliation. Baseline: Continued high levels of youth participation in violent inter-tribal competition and gang-</p>	<p>a) Joint UNDP-UNV initiative to employ youth as paid UN volunteers to serve as mediators and reconcilers in their communities, first piloted in Nairobi slums, extended to five select districts in the Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Coast provinces; b) Tribal elders and community leaders assisted, in collaboration with</p>	<p>a) Joint UNDP-UNV initiatives sustained into second year; b) Sporting and other non-violent forms of inter-tribal competition supported in six select districts. c) Youth in additional five districts assisted in developing socio-economic alternatives to gang activity.</p>	<p>Personnel: US \$ 100,000 (200 national UN volunteers) Miscellaneous (sporting activities and related events; assistance for small businesses to two hundred youth): US \$ 150,000 Total for first year: US \$ 250,000</p>	<p>Personnel: US \$ 100,000 (200 national UN volunteers) Miscellaneous (sporting activities and related events; assistance for small businesses to two hundred youth): US \$ 150,000 Total for first year: US \$ 250,000</p>	<p>a. UNV b. National Steering Committee on Peace-building and Conflict Management c. Traditional leaders d. Provincial administration.</p>

<p>related activity.</p>	<p>the Partnership for Peace, in identifying viable means to pursuing tribal traditions through non-violent means (sporting competitions and joint hunts, for instance);</p> <p>c) Youth in five select districts assisted in disengaging, through the provision of socio-economic alternatives, from participation in the activities of underground gangs and secret societies.</p>			
<p>Output 6:</p> <p>Target: Capacities of UNDP and partner agencies to support dialogue and reconciliation processes strengthened.</p>	<p>First and second years:</p> <p>a) Peace and Development Team established.</p> <p>b) Senior Peace and Development Advisor; two national officers at UNDP; two national officers</p>		<p>First year:</p> <p>International staff: US \$ 400, 000</p> <p>National staff: US \$ 80, 000</p> <p>International travel: US \$ 40, 000</p>	

	<p>at the secretariat of the Partnership for Peace; and advisor on national cohesion deployed for 2008-2010 with the office of the prime minister and the Ministry of Justice.</p> <p>c) Vehicle for in-country travel and driver</p> <p>d) M&E activities conducted, including with the assistance of UNHQ.</p>			<p>Vehicle, driver and maintenance: US\$50,000</p> <p>Total for first year: US \$ 570, 000</p> <p>Second year:</p> <p>International staff: US \$ 400, 000</p> <p>National staff: US \$ 80, 000</p> <p>Vehicle maintenance and driver: US\$15,000</p> <p>Total for second year: US \$ 495, 000</p>	
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Total costs for first year: US \$ 1, 635, 000

Total CO contribution: US \$ 400, 000

Total sought from BCPR: US \$ 1, 235, 000

Total costs for second year (to be mobilized from bilateral donors and UNDP): US \$ 1, 455, 000